Robust & Scalable Website Fingerprinting via Minimal DRAM Traffic

arXiv:2611.09422v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Website fingerprinting attacks infer websites visited by users and threaten their privacy. These attacks are classified as on-path, which monitor network traffic, and co-located, which exploit shared system resources. Existing co-located attacks, such as sweep-counting and loop-counting, achieve over 90% accuracy but suffer significant performance degradation on many-core systems. Loop-counting accuracy drops from 93% on 8 cores to 50% on 24 cores, while sweep-counting accuracy decreases from 84% to 45% across multiple Core Complex Dies (CCDs). To address these limitations, we propose memory-chasing, a scalable website fingerprinting attack that exploits DRAM traffic interference through pointer-chasing traversals with minimal interference.